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Commentary on Todd Battistelli’s “Rhetoric, Dialectic and
Derailment in Church-State Arguments”
FRANS H. VAN EEMEREN
Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric
University of Amsterdam
Spuistraat 134
1012 VB Amsterdam
The Netherlands
f.h.vaneemeren@uva.nl

In “Rhetoric, dialectic and derailment in church-state arguments” Battistelli discusses a
topic that is of vital importance to the study of argumentation: the extent to which
dialectical and rhetorical approaches can be reconciled. After reviewing some
conceptions of rhetoric in modern argumentation theory he proposes an alternative
conceptualization based on classical sophistic tradition that exceeds the bounds set by the
pragma-dialectical notion of strategic manoeuvring. Before commenting on Battistelli’s
alternative, it may be helpful to provide some background information concerning my
own view on the matter.
The issue of the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric is an old one and the
discussion and about this issue can easily be prolonged to become an eternal one. A
precondition for coming to any conclusion is, of course, that it is first made clear what
exactly is understood by “dialectic” and “rhetoric.” And this is precisely where the
difficulties start. I think that two general approaches to this question can be distinguished:
first, an approach that has primarily an empirical-historical basis; second, an approach
that is in the first place theoretically-systematic.
In the empirical-historical approach, which may easily acquire essentialistic traits,
the definition of dialectic and rhetoric is made dependent on what a certain historical
source understood dialectic and rhetoric to be. When it comes to rhetoric, this source
may, for instance, be Aristotle, Hermagoras of Temnos, Cicero or Quintilian — a new
tendency is to go back all the way to the sophists. In any case, as regards their definition
of rhetoric there are considerable differences between the various potential sources and it
is hard to make out on empirical-historical grounds which choice is the best. All the
same, this does not seem prevent some scholars from declaring their favoured choice
sacrosanct.
The standardized version of classical rhetorical theory that is nowadays generally
taught in rhetoric classes has blurred the existing diversity among rhetoricians regarding
the definition of rhetoric. Since no one has taken out a patent for the use of the term
rhetoric, a choice can be made freely and because of the incongruities between the
definitions such a choice has to be made. In the absence of any further explanation one
gets the impression that more often than not the choice that is made just depends on what
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the theorist concerned suits or likes best. An additional, “technical” problem of the
empirical-historical approach is by the way that the conceptions of rhetoric developed in
antiquity are not always fully clear to the modern mind so that a philological clarification
is required—and even after this clarification is provided they may still not fully cover
modern argumentative reality.
In his essay Battistelli shows himself to be, grosso modo, a representative of the
empirical-historical approach to rhetoric. Before explaining what he thinks rhetoric is, he
stresses after all that it is a drawback of the conception of rhetoric adhered to by modern
argumentation scholars such as Jacobs, Rescher, and Slob that it “is not consonant with
the full range of rhetorical theory available.”
The theoretically-systematic approach to dialectic and rhetoric, which is chosen
by argumentation theorists such as myself, is guided by theoretical considerations
concerning what conception of dialectic and rhetoric is most constructive for realizing the
analytic and evaluative objectives of their research program. Rather than being a
philologist, I am an argumentation theorist who tries to make good use of historical and
philological insights to enrich his theory. The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation
we have developed in Amsterdam starts from a critical rationalist idea of reasonableness
and in building this theory we paid tribute (like Popper did before us) to our source of
inspiration in classical dialectic as portrayed in Plato’s Socratic dialogues and described
by Aristotle.
When pragma-dialectics started in a later stage of its development to involve
effectiveness next to reasonableness in its theorizing through the notion of strategic
manoeuvring we realized immediately that vital insights concerning the effectiveness of
argumentative discourse could be derived from rhetoric — starting with classical rhetoric.
In pursuing this endeavour we started from the division of labour between dialectic and
rhetoric that can be found in Aristotle’s work but soon enough we realised that an
integrated dialectical and rhetorical approach was due. Most important, however, for
these comments, is that we concentrated on rhetorical insights that can play a role in the
pragma-dialectical theorizing concerning argumentation.
From the outset we have made it clear that, rather than special ways of conducting
argumentation, dialectic and rhetoric are to us theoretical perspectives that can be used in
analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse, which may complement each other.
As far as rhetoric is concerned, our point of departure has always been that the rhetorical
effectiveness of strategic manoeuvres in not just determined by the presentational choices
that are made (“stylistics”), but also by the adaptation of the manoeuvres to the (primary
or secondary) audience that is to be convinced (“audience management”) and the way in
which the available topical potential is exploited in accordance with the dialectical and
rhetorical requirement of the argumentative situation (“topical invention”). These three
aspects are in our view (as expressed in the “strategic manoeuvring triangle”) inextricably
united in the argumentative moves that are made and they are only distinguished from
each other for analytic reasons.
In his essay, Battistelli makes a major issue of distinguishing between “unilateral”
and “multilateral” views of rhetoric. I wonder, to be honest, whether Batistelli is right in
suggesting that unilaterality was the focal point of the critique of rhetoric delivered by
Plato cum suis. Battistelli is certainly right however in observing—in a completely
different vein—that rhetoric was to Plato’s Socrates “an art of appealing to appetites and
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appearances quite distinct from a dialectical process of reasoning that uncovers substance
and truth.” In any case, as regards multilateralness, I see eye to eye with Battistelli,
because I too prefer a multilateral view of rhetoric, if only because this fits nicely with
our conception of strategic manoeuvring as always involving simultaneously a dialectical
dimension and a rhetorical dimension. The more parallel the two theoretical perspectives
(are made to) run the easier it will be to put the insights their combination provides to
good use in analyzing and evaluating strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse.
“The rhetorical mindset is always inhabiting an unspoken dialogue,” Battistelli contends.
I surely hope this is true because it agrees very well with the approach to argumentative
discourse promoted in extended pragma-dialectics.
I cannot find fault either with Battistelli’s view that rhetoric is more than just
style. This is in fact what we emphatically claimed when talking about the three aspects
of strategic manoeuvring and this is also why I reject Battistelli’s allegation that we start
from a definition of rhetoric which “remove[s] rhetoric from any role in the process of
generating and exchanging viewpoints.” Not only does the pragma-dialectical view of
rhetoric through its association with dialectic in the notion of strategic manoeuvring not
at all presuppose the “passive audience” denounced by Battistelli, because both parties
can influence the progress of the argumentation process at every point (so much for
viewing rhetoric in terms of “a static set of expectations concerning the audience”), but
also does the pragma-dialectical view of rhetoric explicitly include a creative dimension
of inventio by incorporating for both parties making topical choices as a third aspect of
strategic manoeuvring.
Another important point to note is that pragma-dialecticians do indeed think that
from rhetoric insights can be derived regarding the effectiveness of argumentation, but
that this claim cannot be reversed: we do not say that rhetorical insights are always
necessarily insights regarding effectiveness. It might even be true that Battistelli is right
in suggesting that rhetoric offers useful insights “outside strategic manoeuvring” for
making clear how certain verbal or non-verbal moves may be helpful in establishing or
restoring the fulfilment of what pragma-dialecticians call “higher order” conditions for
conducting a critical discussion. Minister Scott’s appeals to pathos which, according to
Battistelli, “aim to serve another role in [his] attempt at furthering the discussion” seem a
good example. Just before Battistelli states his general conclusion, he makes another
relevant observation: “[O]nce argumentation has derailed, rhetoric can provide the means
for opening up solidified attitudes through appeal to the ambiguity and plurality of
opinion existing in a given rhetorical setting.” Battistellis’s observations resemble those
of Jacobs, and it becomes clear that rhetoric as he views it has an important role to play in
indicating how to promote reasonableness in argumentative reality.
Although—as should be clear by now—I like the constructive thrust of
Battistelli’s expose, I also think that in pushing his point he sometimes exaggerates a bit
so that he proves himself guilty of moving his portrayal of argumentative reality too
much into his own direction at the expense of remaining credible to the unconverted. A
striking example is: “In a sense, neither the rhetor’s nor audience’s ideas are their own
but are instead an inchoate amalgam of each other’s.” Another implausible exaggeration
is “[O]ne’s own point is never truly one’s own but emerges from one's enmeshed position
in the network of social discourse.” Eventually, however, both Battistelli and I agree with
Cicero that, in spite of the Ciceronian wisdom that the identities of rhetor and audience
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“are not easily separable,” an arguer must “deal with people as they are” and has to find
arguments and appeals “he knows are likely to appeal to his audience.” The problem is
that we have only just entered a new stage in the development of argumentation theory in
which dialectical and rhetorical insights are brought to bear together in systematically
analyzing and evaluating situated argumentative discourse and that we still have to find
out how exactly the question of how to trace such arguments and appeals can be tackled.
Link to paper
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